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Antitrust and Patent Law Analysis 
of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
 
 So-called “reverse” payments occur when a patentee and infringement 
defendant settle infringement litigation with an arrangement under which the 
patentee pays the alleged infringer to stay out of the market for the period of time 
covered by the settlement.1  Terms such as “pay for delay” may be more 
descriptive than the term “reverse payment.”2 
Suppose that a widget patentee observes incipient competition from a rival 
producer and files an infringement action. This lawsuit could be settled by (1) the 
infringement defendant's purchase of an exclusive or nonexclusive license from 
the patentee, followed by the defendant's production under the license; or (2) the 
infringement plaintiff's purchase from the defendant of a promise that the 
defendant abandon its entry plans. Alternative (1) brings a new rival into the 
market. It can bring production closer to the competitive level, depending on 
whether the license is price- or quantity-restricted. It can also encourage further 
innovation in the market by giving two companies an incentive to improve on the 
widget. By contrast, alternative (2) keeps the rival out of the market and induces 
it to drop its suit in exchange for a payment. There are competitive reasons for 
favoring inclusive rather than exclusive settlements. Outside the context of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and pharmaceutical patent disputes, settlements of the 
second type are very rare. 
Settlement agreements that involve a reverse payment plus the infringement 
defendant's abandonment of the market do not involve a license of any IP right at 
all. If the dispute is settled by a payment from the defendant to the plaintiff in 
exchange for the defendant's right to produce under the patent, the settlement is 
a license. Most IP settlements result in the creation of a license, and the proper 
scope of such licenses is a legitimate IP concern. By contrast, if the dispute is 
settled by the infringement plaintiff's payment to the defendant to stay out of the 
market, there is no license, and thus the policy of the Patent Act encouraging 
licensing is not invoked. This fact justifies closer scrutiny of exit payments. 
Potentially anticompetitive IP settlements are entitled to deference when they 
involve the creation of IP licenses whose scope must be assessed against 
competitive risks. But when no license is created, no such deference is needed.3 
                                               
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law 
1 See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2046c (2d ed. 2005). 
2 See, e.g.,  C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem , 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553 (2006). 
3 Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (agreement requiring royalty 
payments on patent that never issued could not be patent “misuse,” for one cannot misuse a 
nonexistent patent; distinguishing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), which found misuse 
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For example, we would not permit parties to settle an ordinary breach of contract 
dispute by an agreement fixing their prices or dividing their markets.4 To be sure, 
this observation does not completely settle the issue. If a patent is valid and 
infringed, then the infringement defendant can be excluded without the need for 
the payment, and the settlement merely produces that result. 
In a perfectly functioning market with no transaction costs, a monopoly 
producer would very likely be indifferent as to producing everything itself or 
simply licensing another to make part of its production. The license fee would be 
the monopoly markup, output would remain at the monopoly level as it would in 
any perfect cartel agreement, and the monopolist would earn the same profits, 
although part of those profits would be paid as license fees rather than as 
markup on goods that the monopolist produced. 
If all parties were completely certain that a patent was valid and infringed, a 
patentee could either produce all output under the patent itself, or it could license 
some output to a rival, earning its part of its profits as royalties rather than on 
sales of the patented product.5 However, assuming zero transaction costs, a firm 
in that position would have no incentive whatsoever to pay another firm to stay 
out of the market. Given its patent, it could exclude without paying anything at all. 
This fact may explain why historically nearly all licensing agreements involve 
licenses given to the infringement defendant contemplating actual production, not 
exit payments. The exit payment necessarily reduces the patentee's surplus; the 
license reduces the surplus only if the licensee fee extracts less than the full 
monopoly rent from the licensee. 
Transaction costs change the picture somewhat. First, if winning an 
infringement suit and obtaining an injunction cost $1 million, then the patentee 
might be willing to pay the infringement defendant up to that amount to stay out 
of the market, because the cost of the settlement would be lower than the cost of 
an injunction achieving the same result. Of course, the settlement would not 
resolve questions about the patent's validity or coverage while the court's 
judgment might, making the settlement less valuable.6 
 
                                                                                                                                            
when the patent had issued and the contract required royalty payments extending beyond the 
patent's term; see  10 Antitrust Law ¶1782c5 (3d ed. 2011, forthcoming). 
4 For example, if A was a dominant firm and potential rival B owed A a large sum of money, 
the parties would not be permitted to settle their dispute with an agreement that A would forgive 
the debt in exchange for B's promise to stay out of the market. In such a case no IP rights are at 
issue and the “settlement” is a naked market-division agreement. 
5 Cf. Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821(Fed. Cir. 1991), where Intel owned a patent on a 
processor chip but hired Sanyo as its “foundry,” or “subcontractor” to produce patents under its 
license. 
6 While a court's judgment of validity and infringement would not bind non-parties, the 
decision could nevertheless have a significant impact on future entrants into the patentee's 
market. 
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Reverse payment settlements are almost entirely a consequence of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.7  Mainly, the Act is designed to facilitate the entry of generic 
drugs by providing the first generic drug maker to challenge a pioneer drug 
patent and enter the market with a 180 day period of exclusivity.  This period 
applies during the pendency of the settlement even if the generic is not 
producing, creating a situation that only the pioneer continues to produce the 
drug.  Under subsequent statutory amendments the generic loses the 180 day 
exclusivity period if it does not produce and market its generic within sventy-five 
days of approval of its abbreviated drug application to the FDA (ANDA) and 
within thirty months of its initial filing.8  However, no other generic is entitled to 
the 180 day exclusivity period, so that particular incentive to enter the market 
with a generic equivalent is lost.9 
  
 At this writing the Circuit Courts of Appeal are in a three way split over the 
antitrust legality of so-called “reverse payment” settlements.  The Sixth Circuit 
has declared them unlawful per se.10  The Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit 
(applying Second Circuit law) conclude that they are legal per se provided that 
the patent infringement litigation leading up to the settlement was not a “sham” 
and the settlement does not reach beyond the scope of the patent.11  The 
                                               
7 In particular, 21 U.S.C. §355(j).  See also ; and see Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified mainly in 21 U.S.C.).   See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A 
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 Mich.L.Rev. 37 (2009) (arguing for presumptive 
antitrust illegality); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents?, 98 Am. Econ. 
Rev. (2008) (similar); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as 
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L.Rev. 1553 (2006) (similar).  Cf.  Daniel A. Crane, Exit 
Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic 
Implications, 54 Fla.L.Rev. 747 (2002) (similar); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are 
Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?”, 47 Antitrust Bull. 491 (2002) (similar); David W. 
Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent 
Litigation, 98 Geo.L.J. 1303 ( 2010) (similar). 
8  21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I). 
9The entire regulatory procedure is succinctly described in C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate 
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).  See also MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 345–71 
(2009). 
10 Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).  See also Schering Plough 
Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003), rev’d, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (FTC’s view that 
such settlements are presumptively unlawful, reversed by Eleventh Circuit’s rule of reason 
approach). 
11 Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-213 (2d Cir. 2006); Arkansas 
Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), pet. for cert. 
filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 06, 2010)(NO. 10-762); Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlide Antitrust Litig., 
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   Arkansas Carpenters rejected an antitrust challenge to a $400 
million settlement paid by pioneer to a generic producer not to market a generic version of 
ciprofloxacin.  See Judge Pooler’s lengthy dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.625 F.3d 779 
(2d Cir. 2010) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  See also Androgel Antitrust Litigation, 
2010-1 Trade Cas. ¶76914 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 22, 2010);  K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 2010-1 Trade Cas. 
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Eleventh Circuit would apply a rule of reason.12  The Federal Trade Commission 
has consistently opposed these agreements as unlawful under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.13  The Antitrust Division has recently changed its position and now 
regards them as presumptively unlawful as well, or at least as subject to a 
truncated rule of reason inquiry.14 
 
 Even if the pioneer drug maker’s patent were absolutely invalid the parties 
to a Hatch-Waxman infringement suit (the pioneer and the first generic) would 
have a strong incentive to settle.  In general the amount of the settlements 
exceeds the profit expectations that the generic might reasonably anticipate from 
its own competitive entry plus the 180 day period of exclusivity. That is to say, 
the settlement is a windfall to the generic.15  If the generic enters the market and 
the generic and pioneer behave competitively, prices will drop much closer to 
production costs and the generic can anticipate a 180 day period of profits at or 
perhaps somewhere above the competitive level.  After 180 days additional 
generics can enter to the extent of market demand and prices will likely fall 
further.  By contrast, if the two firms settle, only the pioneer will produce, earning 
the full monopoly profits that demand for the drug warrants, and the generic will 
share in these profits.  That is to say, the two firms will share the monopoly rather 
than compete with one another, and the settlement will presumably approximate 
the returns to a legal two-firm cartel.16  The size of Hatch-Waxman payments 
                                                                                                                                            
¶76949, 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. March 24, 2010) (reverse payment settlement was neither per se 
illegal nor subject to rebuttable presumption of illegality requiring a competitive justification for the 
payment because the settlement did not exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent and the 
infringement lawsuits that preceded it were not objectively baseless); King Drug Co. v. Cephalon, 
702 F.Supp.2d 514, (E.D.Pa. 2010) (similar). 
12 See Schering Plough, supra, and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
13 E.g., Schering Plough, supra. 
14 See Brief for the United States, Arkansas Carpenters, supra, available at 2009 WL 
2429249. 
15Henry N. Butler and Jeffrey Pau Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Court 
Should not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation, 98 Iowa L.Rev. 57 (2010) (noting this issue; observing, however, the the 
availability of reverse payments may in fact increase the number of generic applications and the 
overall effect may be greater entry of generic drugs).   See also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech 
Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“A ban on reverse-payment settlements 
would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options 
should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought anticompetitive.”). The Hatch-
Waxman Act regards the generics filing of its drug application as an act of infringement.  See  35 
U.S.C. 271(e)(1)-(2).   As a result it is very likely that the generic has not invested substantial 
resources in production at the time the infringement act is triggered. 
16See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 209, noting that if the patent is found 
invalid, “the total profits of the patent holder and the generic manufacturer on the drug in the 
competitive market will be lower than the total profits of the patent holder alone under a patent-
conferred monopoly.” Ordinarily the two settling parties maximize profits by dividing the 
monopoly proceeds without affecting its size.  
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bears this out, with many of them reaching into the several hundreds of millions 
of dollars.17 
 
 This “windfall” element to the generic is a significant factor.  Under the 
Hatch-Waxman approach neither party to the patent infringement suit has an 
incentive to see the suit through to completion, and this distinguishes these suits 
from the ordinary, noncollusive patent infringement action. As a result the degree 
of deference that the courts ordinarily give to settlement actions is unwarranted.  
The premise of this deference is that both sides have taken litigation risks into 
account and the settlement represents a reasonable compromise between a 
finding of infringement, in which the defendant takes nothing and pays damages 
and a finding of invalidity and noninfringement, in which the patent loses 
everything.  In the Hatch-Waxman context, by contrast, any significant doubt 
about the validity of the patent creates a situation in which both parties can profit 
a great deal by entering into the settlement.  Indeed, it is more profitable to the 
infringement defendant to settle than to win.  If the patent has a high likelihood of 
being sustained and infringement found, then the pioneer can be expected to be 
willing to pay much less. 
 
 In the typical infringement case not involving the Hatch-Waxman Act the 
parties most frequently settle by an arrangement under which the infringement 
defendant procures a license and produces under royalty requirements during 
the pendency of the agreement, which typically cannot extend beyond the 
expiration of the patent.18  The Patent Act expressly authorizes production 
licenses of this sort, quite aside from settlement.19  However, the Patent Act does 
not authorize exit payments or other payments by patentees to exclude rivals 
from its market.  Further, in a conventional settlement with a production license a 
high license fee suggests increasing likelihood that the patent was infringed, 
while in the Hatch-Waxman context it suggests increased likelihood that the 
patent was either invalid or not infringed. 
 
 A very high percentage of the pharmaceutical patents subjected to Hatch-
Waxman litigation are found to be invalid or not infringed when courts do reach 
the merits of the patent infringement suit itself.  This number is as high as 73% 
                                               
17E.g., Arkansas Carpenters, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d  Cir. 2010) (Pooler, j., dissenting) ($400 
million settlement).  See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG 
COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY 4 (2010), available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. (estimating consumer costs at $3.5 billion 
annually).  See also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, 109 Columbia L.Rev. at 646 (finding 143 
settlements on 101 brand-name drugs during the period 1984, when Hatch-Waxman was passed, 
through 2008). 
18 Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (invalidating contract calling for royalties to be paid 
beyond expiration of the patent); see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶1782c (3d ed. 2011, in press).  See also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to 
Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. Econ. 391 (2003) (discussing harm caused by settlements that go 
beyond patent term). 
19 See 35 U.S.C. §261; and see 12 ANTITRUST LAW ¶2044. 
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according to one FTC Study.20  This may seem surprising, given that pioneer 
pharmaceutical patents on drug molecules are typically seen as among the more 
robust patents that are granted.21  However, many and perhaps most of the 
patents subject to Hatch-Waxman style litigation are not primary molecule 
patents.  Rather they are subsequently issued patents on dosage variations, 
usage variations, or in some cases changes in the form or manufacturing 
process of the drug, and many of these patents are of much more dubious 
quality.22  In particular, given that the primary patent already exists, these 
variations may not pass patent laws requirements of novelty or nonobvious 
subject matter.23 
 
 This high risk of invalidity or noninfringement findings suggests two things.  
First, it explains why the pioneer drug manufacturer might have a strong 
incentive to settle and share the extended profits with the challenging pioneer 
                                               
20 See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration (July 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.  This figure is somewhat higher than for 
litigated patents generally, where roughly half of litigated patents are found to be invalid. See 
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 28 
Am. Intell.Prop.L.Assn. Q.J. 185 (1998) 
21 E.g., Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve it 
32-33 (2009). 
22See Aaron S. Kesselhelm and Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data to Assess the Value of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J.L.Med. & Ethics 176 (2009) (on “evergreening” of secondary 
patents); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm. 
Tech. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2007); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. 
Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 717, 727 (2005).  Indeed, there is some evidence that Hatch-Waxman 
exacerbates the evergreening problem by facilitating relatively minor secondary patenting and 
shielding them from more careful post-issuance scrutiny.  See Ron A. Bouchard, et al., Empirical 
Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmacueticals, 8 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 174 (2010); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming 
Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 304-306 (2008); 
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
63, 81 (2004) (on evergreening of pharmaceutical patents); Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the 
Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 Idea 
227 (2001).  See also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, 109 Columbia L.Rev. at 638-639 
(describing successive patenting of Lipitor). 
23E.g., Sun Pharm. Indus. V. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing 
obviousness in the context of “double patenting,” or using minor variations in treatment or dosage 
to file secondary patents on top of a primary patent); Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., 
Inc., 377 F.App’x. 978 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (new way of administering established drug invalid for 
obviousness); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  See also Banjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 
Tex.L.Rev. 503 (2009) (on pharmaceutical evergreening and problems relating to novelty and 
nonobviousness); Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle management After 
KSR v. Teleflex, 63 Food & Drug L.J. 275 (2008) (similar); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s 
Nonobvious Problem, 12 Lewis & Clark 375 (2008); Christine S. Paine, Brand Name Drug 
Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations By Slowing Generic Production Through Patent 
Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 497-506 (2003). 
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rather than risk an invalidity finding.  In that sense it “explains” reverse payment 
settlements.  Second, however, assuming that the invalidity or noninfringement 
findings are correct, it also suggests that most of these settlements come with a 
very high social cost – namely, continued exclusivity protection that is not 
justified under the Patent Act.  A reverse payment settlement does nothing to 
bring down the price of a pioneer’s drug during its pendency.  The generic is not 
producing at all.  To the extent that any portion of the settlement payment can be 
regarded as a variable cost it will presumably be passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher, rather than lower, drug prices.  That is, as a monopolist’s costs 
rise its profit-maximizing price typically rises as well. 
 
 Theoretically, a reverse payment settlement that calls for termination and 
production by the generic prior to the expiration date of the litigated payment will 
bring competition earlier than continued exclusive production under a valid patent 
that the generic’s contemplated production would infringe.  Issued patents are 
presumed to be valid,24 although there is no presumption in favor of the patentee 
on questions of infringement.  Further, courts are extremely loathe to inquire into 
the merits of patent settlements even when they involve agreements that would 
be regarded as unlawful under the antitrust laws in the absence of a patent.25  
Nevertheless, a rule of virtual per se legality for reverse payment settlements 
seems quite inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent that has not hesitated to 
examine anticompetitive settlement agreements and occasionally find illegality 
when the practices condoned by the settlement agreement, such as price-fixing 
or concerted exclusion, are not authorized by the patent act.26  Reverse payment 
settlements are in this class of situations. 
 
 A rule attaching too much significance to the duration of the settlement 
agreement and whether it terminates prior to patent expiration is inadvisable in 
any event.  The parties can always negotiate a higher payment over a shorter 
                                               
24 See 35 U.S.C. §282. 
25 See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046. 
26Id.; and see, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (disapproved 
settlement agreement involved pooling plus exclusion); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 
U.S. 371 (1952) (cross-licensing with price restrictions; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (horizontal customer restrictions); United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (similar).  See also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991-992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.): 
Only if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law 
is it vulnerable to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that 
it knows is almost certainly invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive 
a judicial challenge), sues its competitors, and settles the suit by 
licensing them to use its patent in exchange for their agreeing not to sell 
the patented product for less than the price specified in the license. In 
such a case, the patent, the suit, and the settlement would be devices—
masks—for fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law. 
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period of time and would do so if they could thereby avoid antitrust liability.  By 
contrast, a settlement that calls for the generic to stay out of the market beyond 
the expiration of the patent should be regarded as a per se unlawful market 
division.27 
 
 Under the Second Circuit’s rule reverse payment settlements are lawful 
unless the underlying patent litigation is a “sham”28 or the settlement agreement 
goes “beyond the scope of the claims” contained in the patent.29  In one sense, of 
course, the settlement does not go beyond the scope of the patent, which claims 
a right to exclude from the product and uses that it covers.  In another sense, 
however, nothing in the Patent Act justifies the exclusion payment, and in this 
case the exclusion is a consequence of the payment, not of the patent itself.   
Indeed, as the payment becomes higher the presumed quality of the patent is 
less, increasing the inference that the exclusion is caused by the payment rather 
than the patent itself.  Further, a reverse payment is a market division agreement 
which is per se unlawful under antitrust law.  In this case the payment is not 
“ancillary” to anything, because the settling generic is not producing anything.  As 
noted previously, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to condemn 
anticompetitive settlements under the antitrust laws when those agreements 
involved naked restraints on trade that the Patent Act did not authorize. 
 
 There may be some nonantitrust approaches to this problem.30  One 
possible solution is to remove the presumption of patent validity upon the 
showing of a high exit payment.  The Patent Act states that patents are 
presumed to be valid, which means that the burden of proving invalidity rests on 
the challenger.31  But the statutory language says nothing about what it takes to 
defeat the presumption.  In this case, a high exit payment is evidence that the 
patentee doubts that the patent will survive a validity test in court.  Even with the 
presumption removed, however, a court must still determine whether the patent 
was valid and infringed, and thus far they have been largely unwilling to do so. 
 Indeed, one of the driving forces in the debate over the antitrust standard 
to be applied is the reluctance of courts to second-guess settlements by 
questioning the validity of the underlying patent or its infringement.32  Both the 
                                               
27 See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).  On market division agreements 
generally, see Ch. 20D. 
28 A “sham” lawsuit occurs when the right being asserted is to weak that no reasonable 
litigant would have brought the action.  See 3 Antitrust Law ¶706 (sham infringement actions).  
On “sham” litigation generally, see 2 Antitrust Law ¶205. 
29 See Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 103 (quoting Cipro III, 363 F.Supp.2d at 540-541). 
30 The argument in the following paragraphs comes from Christina Bohannan & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation, ch. 3 
(2011, forthcoming). 
31 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
32 See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046; and Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. 
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 
1725 (2003). 
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rule of virtual per se illegality adopted by the Sixth Circuit33 and the rule of virtual 
per se legality adopted by the Second Circuit34 are attempt to resolve the 
antitrust issue without inquiring into the merits of the infringement suit.  A full rule 
of reason query almost certainly means an inquiry into patent validity and 
infringement.  If the patent is valid and infringed by the generic, then even a very 
large payment from the pioneer to the generic for the full remaining life of the 
patent represents a wealth transfer between these parties but causes social 
economic harm only to the extent that the payment increases the pioneer’s costs 
and thus may increase its drug price as well.  Of course, a patentee who knew 
this in advance would be reluctant to make any more than a nuisance value 
payment.  At the other extreme, a patent that is invalid or not infringed should 
invite immediate generic entry, and the delay imposed by the reverse payment 
settlement represents both competitive harm and social cost identical to that 
which flows from any naked market division agreement.  The rules of per se and 
presumptive illegality rest on the premise that a very high payment itself is a 
strong indicator that the pioneer believes its patent is weak or proof of 
infringement unlikely.  A property owner ordinarily does not ordinarily need to pay 
large sums to trespassers to keep them away.  At the same time, there is no 
avoiding the fact that the mere availability of large reverse payment settlements 
substantially undermines the incentives that the generic has to litigate patent 
validity and infringement to their conclusion.. 
One possible avenue is to regard a high exit payment as a signal of 
invalidity, which can then be used to trigger patent reexamination, a process in 
which the PTO reconsiders a patent based on prior art that has been newly 
brought to the PTO’s attention.35  The PTO’s reexamination is based on the best 
evidence available at the time of the examination, and the presumption of validity 
does not apply to the reexamination procedure.36  In a patent infringement suit 
producing an exit payment the prospective generic entrant will already have filed 
its declaration and evidence to the effect that the patent is either invalid or will not 
be infringed by the generic.37  The PTO can rely on this evidence and then make 
its own decision about the patent’s validity.38 
The PTO’s power in a reexamination proceeding is limited, however.  For 
example, while it has the power to declare that a patent is invalid or to narrow its 
                                               
33 Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).   
34 Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-213 (2d Cir. 2006); Arkansas 
Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), pet. for cert. 
filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 06, 2010)(NO. 10-762). 
35 See the PTO’S MANUAL OF PATENTING EXAMINING PROCEDURE (rev. ed. July, 2010), §§ 
2200 (ex parte reexamination) and 2600 (optional inter partes reexamination, which permits 
persons seeking reexamination greater participation in the process), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm.  
36 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
37See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(3)(B)(iv)(II) (2006). 
38This is a variation of a proposal made in  Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent 
Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2011). 
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claims, it cannot decide questions of infringement.  Further, its power to revisit 
validity is largely limited to issues of novelty and nonobviousness, which require 
a reexamination of prior art. Finally, while reexamination typically involves a 
much closer look than the original patent granting process, it is undertaken by the 
same agency and under the same rules.  As a result, any biases in the PTO in 
favor of granting patents or of reading prior art too narrowly, will remain. 
Nevertheless, reexamination is hardly a paper tiger.  Statistics gathered in 
2010 indicate that roughly 25% of patents subjected to ex parte examinations are 
completely confirmed; 10% are completely cancelled; and about 2/3 see their 
claims changed.  By contrast, in inter partes reexamination, a more adversarial 
processes, 60% of the patents were cancelled and 35% saw their claims 
changed.39  An even higher percentage of patents are cancelled in inter partes 
reexamination than are declared invalid in litigation. 
Two things must happen to make the automatic reexamination route work, 
or at least testable as a mechanism for resolving this problem.  First, 
identification of a large reverse payment settlement could trigger a request by an 
appropriate federal agency (FTC or FDA) for inter partes reexamination.  This 
would not require new legislation.  In that proceeding the agency, not the settling 
generic whose interests are compromised, would be the party opposing the 
patent.  The statute permits “any third party requester” to request an inter partes 
reexamination.40  Second, however, in order to be a more complete solution the 
scope of reexamination must be broadened.  The current statute permits 
reexamination only “on the basis of any prior art,” which largely restricts 
reexamination to questions of novelty and nonobviousness.  “Off the record” 
defects such as the on sale bar cannot ordinarily be attacked in reexamination.  
Presumably the great majority of invalid secondary drug patents fail for lack of 
novelty or obviousness, the two inquiries that reside in prior art, but not all do.   
Once a patent survives reexamination it is still subject to challenge in litigation 
but is presumably much stronger than when initially issued, and inter partes 
reexamination is itself an adversarial proceeding. 
 Not all settlement agreements have been validated.  For example, on 
remand from the Valley Drug decision the district court granted the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, and once again found the defendants' exit 
payment settlement per se unlawful.41 The court applied a three-part test “to 
                                               
39 See Alan W. Kowalchyk and Joshua P. Graham, Patent Reexamination, 3 LANDSLIDE 47 
(Sep./Oct. 2010). 
40 35 U.S.C. §311. 
41 Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005), on 
remand from Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 
2003). See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046c2. The summary judgment grant by the district court settled 
the issue of illegality of the settlement agreement but left for trial questions about the plaintiffs' 
injury and damages. See also K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009), 
report and recommendation adopted,  2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. 2010) (reverse payment 
settlement agreement with generic rivals did not restrain trade because (a) it did not exceed scope 
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of patent given that patentee had right to exclude rivals in any event; and (b) the patent 
infringement suit leading up to settlement was not shown to be a sham; refusing to apply 
approach suggested by Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive 
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes ("Hovenkamp"), 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1753 
(2003); Andrx Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(allegations that pioneer and first generic entered an agreement under which first generic would 
never produce, thus excluding other generic firms from market indefinitely, stated cause of action 
under both §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act: “Andrx did sufficiently state a claim under both §1 and 
§2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that Elan's settlement agreement with SkyePharma, coupled 
with SkyePharma's putative agreement not to market, violated antitrust law.”). 
 
See also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Del. 2007), vacated as 
moot, 287 Fed. Appx. 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008), holding that Merck's giving and Apotex's acceptance 
of a covenant not to sue settling patent infringement litigation denied the court jurisdiction over 
the claim and was thus not a triggering event setting the clock running so that Apotex could enter 
the market. The court observed: 
Notwithstanding the body of law that mandates dismissal, the court is 
sensitive to Apotex's argument that Merck is manipulating the court's 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the court must guard its jurisdiction jealously. 
Apotex highlights an interesting yet troublesome practice that has 
emerged from the interplay of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme, 
covenants not to sue, subject-matter jurisdiction, and the typical time 
cycle of a patent litigation. This lawsuit exposes the ability of pioneer 
drug companies to potentially hold generics at bay by suing them, as they 
are authorized to do when a paragraph IV certification is made in an 
ANDA, and then granting a covenant not to sue, which divests the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this way, district courts can be viewed 
as unwitting agents in a pioneer drug company's ability to defer 
competition for as long as possible. As unfortunate as it may be for 
Apotex, this is the framework that the Hatch-Waxman Act created. The 
legislative history suggests that, in fact, Congress contemplated the use 
of covenants not to sue as a means of resolving any controversy created 
by the filing of an ANDA: 
 
The provision [a “civil action to obtain patent certainty”]…is 
intended to clarify that Federal district courts are to entertain 
such suits for declaratory judgments so long as there is a “case or 
controversy” under Article III of the Constitution. We fully 
expect that, in almost all situations where a generic applicant has 
challenged a patent [by filing an ANDA with a paragraph IV 
certification] and not been sued for patent infringement, a claim 
by the generic applicant seeking declaratory judgment on the 
patent will give rise to a justiciable “case or controversy” under 
the Constitution. We believe that the only circumstance in which 
a case or controversy might not exist would arise in the rare 
circumstance in which the patent owner and brand drug company 
have given the generic applicant a covenant not to sue, or 
otherwise formally acknowledge that the generic applicant's drug 
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ensure (1) that the parties did have a bona fide dispute, (2) that the settlement is 
a reasonable accommodation, and (3) that the settlement is not more 
anticompetitive than a likely outcome of the litigation.”42 The court then found that 
there was a substantial question as to the patent's validity.43 In particular, there 
was evidence that enforcement of the patent was precluded by the “on-sale 
bar.”44 The court ultimately concluded after a lengthy analysis of the on-sale bar 
issue that the patent would very likely have been found invalid.45 Further, the 
settlement in this case was not one that terminated the litigation; rather, it simply 
resolved a preliminary injunction issue but kept the underlying litigation as to 
validity alive—howbeit, giving the parties a strong incentive not to pursue it to its 
conclusion46: 
Here, the Agreement did not revolve or even simplify 
Abbott's patent infringement action against Geneva…; to the 
contrary, the Agreement tended to prolong that dispute to 
Abbott's advantage, delaying generic entry for a longer 
period of time than the patent or any reasonable 
interpretation of the patent's protections would have 
provided.47 
In addition, 
the remaining provisions of the Agreement, rather than being 
catalysts for competition and resolution of litigation, are 
comprehensive restraints on Geneva's market entry plans 
                                                                                                                                            
does not infringe. 
149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (Nov. 25, 2003) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, 
ranking member of Senate HELP committee). 
Id. at 424-425. 
And see Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down 
FDA regulation making manufacturer of generic drug ineligible for 180 days of market 
exclusivity if the holder of the new drug application seeks to delist the patent, rather than to 
litigate validity or infringement). 
42 Id. at 1295, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive 
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1727 (2003). 
43 See id. at 1298 (“…any construction of the patent's exclusionary scope” “…that fails to 
take into account the chances of the patent being held invalid would essentially afford pioneer 
drug manufacturers an unbridled power to exclude others without regard to the strength of their 
patent rights”). 
44 35 U.S.C. §102b, which can operate so as to preclude patent protection if the invention in 
the completed form as patented was sold more than one year prior to the filing of the patent 
application. 
45 Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-1305. 
46 Id. at 1309 (“where an agreement involves an interim rather than a final settlement, it is far 
more difficult for the litigants to claim that the agreement was ancillary to an efficient disposition 
of the litigation”), citing Schering Plough Corp., 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003). 
47 Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1309. 
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that by their very terms far exceed the legal scope of the 
patent's provisions.48 
The court then found that these factors were sufficient to warrant application 
of the per se rule. The court found that the agreement, in which the generic firm 
accepted large payments ($4.5 million monthly) for its promise not to compete 
with the pioneer firm's product, was a naked restraint. “Further, because of the 
regulatory framework under Hatch-Waxman, the Agreement had the additional 
effect of delaying the entry of other generic competitors.”49 
As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the FTC's Schering-Plough 
decision, which had condemned a reverse payment settlement under the FTC 
Act.50 The complex facts can be simplified to these basic ones.51 Schering 
produced a potassium supplement called “K-Dur 20,” whose principal ingredient 
was potassium chloride, an unpatentable common substance. The patent at 
issue covered a material coating that covered the potassium chloride and gave it 
time-release properties.52 Two rivals, Upsher and ESI, both sold formulations of 
time-release potassium chloride, which they claimed used a different process not 
covered by the Schering patent. Schering disagreed and sued the two firms for 
patent infringement. These suits were settled under an agreement requiring 
Schering to pay Upsher $60 million and ESI $15 million for agreements that the 
                                               
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1314. The court also noted that the challenged agreement barred Geneva, the generic, 
“from marketing any terazosin hydrochloride product, including those that were not at issue in the 
patent case.” 
50 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 
(2006). See also Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009) (exit 
payment of $398 million to generic to stay out of market not an unreasonable restraint because its 
size suggested that patentee believed that risk that its patent would be found invalid was relatively 
low: 
However, although direct plaintiffs contend that the amount of the exclusion payment in this 
case—$398 million—corresponds to a perceived chance of losing of about 50 percent, in absolute 
numbers Bayer's perceived chance of losing would appear to be much lower. How direct 
plaintiffs calculated this number is difficult to fathom, especially since they cite Professor 
Hovenkamp's explanation of expected gains and losses in analyzing the anti-competitive effects 
of exclusion payments, who states: “[I]f the patentee has a 25% chance of losing, it is willing to 
pay up to 25% of the value of its monopoly to exclude its competitors without a trial.” Herbert 
Hovenkamp, [Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley,] Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual 
Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1759 (2003). Applying this model to Bayer's 
situation—plaintiffs submit that Bayer stood to lose more than $1.5 billion in profits if the '444 
Patent was invalidated—reveals that Bayer's payment of $398 million translates to a perceived 
chance of losing of 26.5 percent. Of course, Bayer's payment to Barr was likely also constrained 
by the maximum amount Bayer expected Barr to make if it won the lawsuit, but applying a 
straight “expectation” economic analysis to these facts would indicate that Bayer was relatively 
confident of its chances of winning at trial. 
51 See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058-1062; and see the FTC's decision, Schering-Plough 
Corp., 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C., Dec. 8, 2003). 
52 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058. 
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latter two firms would stay out of the K-Dur 20 market. However, Schering also 
obtained a license to market a different drug, Niacor, which was under 
development at Upsher. That right was subsequently determined to have little 
value. 
In speaking of the proper mode of antitrust analysis for these agreements the 
Eleventh Circuit stated: 
We think that neither the rule of reason nor the per se 
analysis is appropriate in this context. We are bound by our 
decision in Valley Drug53 where we held both approaches to 
be ill-suited for an antitrust analysis of patent cases because 
they seek to determine whether the challenged conduct had 
an anticompetitive effect on the market. By their nature, 
patents create an environment of exclusion, and 
consequently, cripple competition. The anticompetitive effect 
is already present. What is required here is an analysis of 
the extent to which antitrust liability might undermine the 
encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent to 
which the patent laws prevent antitrust liability for such 
exclusionary effects. Id. Therefore, in line with Valley Drug, 
we think the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an 
examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed 
that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.54 
 
As the court elaborated: 
Although we acknowledged in Valley Drug that an 
agreement to allocate markets is clearly anticompetitive, 
resulting in reduced competition, increased prices, and a 
diminished output, we nonetheless reversed for a rather 
simple reason: one of the parties owned a patent. We 
                                               
53 Citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 n.27 (11th Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004). 
On remand the district court in Valley Drug had once again applied the per se rule. See 
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The Eleventh 
Circuit evidently approved in its Schering-Plough decision: 
We note that the case at bar is wholly different from Valley Drug. The critical difference is 
that the agreements at issue in Valley Drug did not involve final settlements of patent litigation, 
and, moreover, the Valley Drug agreements did not permit the generic company to market its 
product before patent expiration. On remand, the district court emphasized that the “[a]greement 
did not resolve or even simplify Abbott's patent infringement action…to the contrary, the 
Agreement tended to prolong that dispute to Abbott's advantage, delaying generic entry for a 
longer period of time than the patent or any reasonable interpretation of the patent's protections 
would have provided. Given these material distinctions, the same analysis cannot apply.” 
54 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065-1066 n.14. 
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recognized the effect of agreements that employ extortion-
type tactics to keep competitors from entering the market. In 
the context of patent litigation, however, the anticompetitive 
effect may be no more broad than the patent's own 
exclusionary power. To expose those agreements to 
antitrust liability would obviously chill such settlements.55 
The court then began its analysis of the settlement agreement at issue with 
the observation that every patent is presumed valid.56  The Patent Act also 
permits patents to be both assigned57 and licensed.58  The court then observed: 
Although the FTC alleges that Schering's settlement 
agreements are veiled attempts to disguise a quid pro quo 
arrangement aimed at preserving Schering's monopoly in the 
potassium chloride supplement market, there has been no 
allegation that the '743 patent itself is invalid or that the 
resulting infringement suits against Upsher and ESI were 
“shams.” Additionally, without any evidence to the contrary, 
there is a presumption that the '743 patent is a valid one, 
which gives Schering the ability to exclude those who 
infringe on its product. Therefore, the proper analysis now 
turns to whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's conclusion that the challenged agreements 
restrict competition beyond the exclusionary effects of the 
'743 patent.59 
Although it is true that a patent is presumed to be valid, the issue in the 
underlying infringement controversy was not whether the patent for K-Dur 20 was 
valid, but whether the competing products produced by Upsher and ESI infringed 
that patent. As a general matter there is no presumption that a rival technology 
infringes a valid patent. Rather, the patentee has the burden of establishing 
infringement.60 
By the same token, in and of themselves exit payment settlements are 
typically not licenses. A common traditional method of settling patent litigation is 
for the alleged infringer to purchase a license from the patentee, and of course 
such a settlement includes the license. In a reverse payment case, by contrast, 
the patentee is simply paying the alleged infringer to stay out of the market, and 
not to pursue the question of infringement further through litigation. As a result, 
the settlement does not include a license at all, but merely a naked payment to 
another to stay out of the payor's market. 
The panel rejected the FTC's conclusion that the collateral license for Niacor 
                                               
55 Id. at 1064. 
56 Id. at 1066, citing 35 U.S.C. §282, and numerous decisions. 
57 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066, citing 35 U.S.C. §261. 
58 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1067, citing several decisions. 
59 Id. at 1068. 
60 See, e.g., Kegel Co., Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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was in fact a subterfuge, citing evidence in the record that this license was in fact 
believed to be valuable at the time. In so doing the court accepted the 
interpretation of the evidence given by the administrative law judge rather than 
the contrary interpretation subsequently given by the Commission, which 
reversed the ALJ's decision.61 
To be sure, exposing settlement agreements to antitrust scrutiny chills them, 
but that does not mean that every settlement is immune from such scrutiny. In 
this case, a rule permitting scrutiny of reverse payments would do no more than 
limit agreements calling for such payments. But such payments are of little or no 
social utility unless they are intended to offset the nuisance costs of a lawsuit. 
Further, what the court did not notice is that all property rights are presumed 
valid in the sense that their ownership is not typically questioned in an antitrust 
case. Property rights can usually be assigned and licensed; however, this does 
not prevent antitrust tribunals from assessing market divisions or other cartel 
agreements that cover those rights. Patent rights are property rights and are 
treated as such except when the Patent Act or special circumstances making 
patent rights distinctive so warrant. For example, for the owner of a building to 
license a rival to share a portion of it would almost certainly not be an antitrust 
violation; however, for the owner to pay a competitor not to build a competing 
facility would very likely be unlawful per se. In sum, IP rights, like all property 
rights, come with the rights that they have, but these do not include rights to 
violate the antitrust laws unless a more particularized warrant can be found in the 
IP statutes or sound policy analysis. 
The court's emphasis on the presumption of validity seems to ignore the real 
anticompetitive threat of many such disputes, including this one, where the 
question is not whether the patent is valid, but rather whether the infringement 
defendant's product infringes the patent. While there is a presumption of validity, 
infringement must be proven, and reverse settlement payments can provide a 
ready vehicle for permitting a patentee and the maker of a (noninfringing) 
competing product to cartelize the market. In the case of no infringement the 
agreement more closely resembles the naked market division agreement among 
owners of competing buildings, rather than the division of a jointly owned one. 
In Tamoxifen a pioneer drug manufacturer sued Barr for patent 
infringement.62 After the district court held the patent invalid the parties settled 
with a scheme under which Barr received a large payment and also a license to 
produce an authorized generic, provided that the lower court vacated judgment of 
invalidity, which it did. Subsequent challengers were not able to establish 
                                               
61 Assuming that the record contained evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support [the Commission's] conclusion,” the court was obliged to accept the 
interpretation of the Commission rather than the administrative law judge. See FTC v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). 
62 Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 
(2007). For another critique, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553 (2006). 
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invalidity. The Second Circuit rejected an antitrust challenge, noting its 
longstanding encouragement of settlements, and refused to upset the traditional 
presumption of patent validity.63  The Second Circuit majority concluded that the 
underlying infringement lawsuit was not a sham, and this was sufficient for it to 
refuse to disapprove the settlement. Indeed, the majority believed that a rule of 
per se legality was essential “even if it leads in some cases to the survival of 
monopolies created by what would otherwise be fatally weak patents.”64  
A dissenter complained: 
Holding that a Hatch-Waxman settlement agreement cannot 
violate antitrust laws unless the underlying litigation was a 
sham also ill serves the public interest in having the validity 
of patents litigated.65  This interest exists because “[i]t is as 
important to the public that competition should not be 
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a 
really valuable invention should be protected in his 
monopoly.” Litigating the validity of drug company patents is 
critically important to the general well being in light of the 
recent trend toward capping the maximum amounts insurers 
and public benefit plans will spend on medications. 
A Hatch-Waxman settlement, by definition, protects the 
parties' interests as they see them. Whether it also promotes 
the public's interest depends on the facts. If the validity of the 
patent is clear, and the generic company receives a license 
to market the patent holder's product, competition is 
increased. However, if, as in this case, the patent has 
already been shown to be vulnerable to attack and the 
generic manufacturer is paid to keep its generic product off 
the market, it is hard to see how the public benefits. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive for the 
second kind of agreement that other patent laws do not 
provide. Patent litigation other than Hatch-Waxman patent 
litigation generally proceeds along familiar lines. A patent 
holder sues an alleged infringer, and the infringer either 
chooses to go to trial to vindicate its view that the patent is 
invalid or pays the patent holder money as compensation for 
damages the patent holder has suffered or as the price of a 
license. In this context, one can perhaps assume that the 
parties' relative views on the strength of a patent will result in 
a pro-competitive or neutral result. If the patent holder 
believes its patent is strong, it will proceed to trial, knowing 
                                               
63 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202. 
64 Id. at 212. 
65 Citing United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973). 
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that it can collect damages at the end. The generic 
manufacturer, if it believes the patent holder's patent is 
weak, may be willing to risk damages and market its product 
during the litigation, thereby promoting competition. And if 
the claims are in relative equipoise, a licensing arrangement 
may well result. 
In contrast, a generic competitor subject to Hatch-Waxman cannot 
enter the market for the first thirty months after litigation is commenced 
against it. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii). In addition, whether its attack 
against the patent is strong or weak, the benefit it will obtain by 
successfully litigating to the finish is not great. At best, it will obtain 180 
days in which it will be the exclusive generic on the market. See 21 U.S.C. 
§355(j)(5)(B)(iv). On the other hand, the benefits to the public from the 
completion of litigation can be enormous if the generic challenger prevails 
as it did, at least initially, here. Once the 180-day exclusivity period is over, 
any generic that wishes to market a generic product and that can establish 
its product is bioequivalent to the patented product can enter the market, 
thus providing increased competition. 
Moreover, the thirty-month stay provides an incentive to the patent 
holder to pay its generic competitor more than the generic company could 
have realized from winning the lawsuit. This is so because once the 
settlement is reached and the litigation dismissed, another generic 
manufacturer will have to wait at least thirty months after litigation is 
commenced against it to begin production. Thus, the patent holder will be 
protected against all generic competition for thirty months after the first 
lawsuit is terminated. This problem is aggravated when the agreement 
between the putative competitors provides that the generic company can 
deploy its exclusivity period after sitting on it until another ANDA applicant 
attempts to enter the market. These anti-competitive effects—and others 
not present in this case—have caused antitrust scholars to propose 
various analytical frameworks for determining whether an antitrust 
violation has occurred when a patent holder makes a reverse payment to 
settle patent litigation. The analytical frameworks proposed vary both as to 
burden of proof and as to the evidence necessary to find a reverse 
payment illegal.66 
In the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ciprofloxacin (Cipro), Barr filed an ANDA 
for a generic version of Cipro before the pioneer's patent on the drug and its 
method of administration had expired, claiming that the pioneer's patent was 
                                               
66 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 225-227, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. 
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 
1759 (2004); Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 Minn. L. 
Rev. 698, 709 (2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to 
Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, 
Janis and Lemley, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1789, 1795-1797, 1802 (2003). 
Hovenkamp Reverse Payment Settlements             Jan. 2011, page 19 
 19
invalid for obviousness.67  The parties then settled a patent infringement suit, 
providing that Barr would not market Cipro under its ANDA until after the patent 
in question had expired. In exchange Barr received a payment of $49.1 million 
initially, plus subsequent payments totaling $398.1 million. Thereupon followed 
litigation against other alleged infringers suggesting that the patent was valid, or 
at least colorably valid. The Federal Circuit concluded that an antitrust market 
division claim should be tried under the full rule of reason. It rejected the Solicitor 
General's view that “an appropriate antitrust analysis ‘should take into account 
the relative likelihood of success of the parties' claims, viewed ex ante.’”68 The 
Solicitor General accepted in principle the view that the larger the payment, the 
more suspicious the patent, thus warranting at least some investigation into the 
patent's validity or the question of infringement.69 The Federal Circuit rejected 
such an approach: 
We disagree that analysis of patent validity is appropriate in 
the absence of fraud or sham litigation. Pursuant to statute, 
a patent is presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.C. §282, and patent 
law bestows the patent holder with “the right to exclude 
others from profiting by the patented invention.” Dawson 
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
A settlement is not unlawful if it serves to protect that to 
which the patent holder is legally entitled—a monopoly over 
the manufacture and distribution of the patented invention. 
…Thus, the district court correctly concluded that there is no 
legal basis for restricting the right of a patentee to choose its 
preferred means of enforcement and no support for the 
notion that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to thwart 
settlements….As Judge Posner remarked, if “there is 
nothing suspicious about the circumstances of a patent 
settlement, then to prevent a cloud from being cast over the 
settlement process a third party should not be permitted to 
haul the parties to the settlement over the hot coals of 
antitrust litigation.”70 
The court then held that the exclusion license survived rule of reason scrutiny. 
                                               
67 Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 
sub nom. Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009). 
68 Id. at 1337, quoting the Solicitor General's brief in a Second Circuit decision on which 
certiorari had been denied. See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied sub nom. Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc., 551 U.S. 1144 (2007). In that decision the SG 
had argued that the petition should be denied, stating that “[a]lthough the petition presents an 
important and difficult question, and the court of appeals adopted an incorrect standard, this case 
does not appear to be a good vehicle for resolving the question presented.” SG's brief, available at 
2007 WL 1511527. 
69 On this point, see 12 ANTITRUST LAW ¶2046c. 
70 Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1337, quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (other citations omitted). 
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Although Bayer, the patentee, did have market power in the relevant market 
there was no evidence that the agreement restricted the challenges of others to 
the patent or otherwise restrained competition outside of the patent's ordinary 
“exclusionary zone.”71 The essence of the agreement in this case was to keep 
someone other than the patentee from practicing the patent until after its 
expiration, which was precisely what the patent granted. The court added in a 
footnote: 
Indeed, a sizable exclusion payment from the patent holder 
to the generic manufacturer is not unexpected under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, where the relative risks of litigation are 
redistributed.72 
 
 
   
 
                                               
71 Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1340. 
72 Id. at 1333 n.11, citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). See Jessie Cheng, note, An Antitrust Analysis of 
Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471 (2008); Thomas 
Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-Waxman Reform, 93 Va. L. Rev. 459 
(2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 Tex. L. 
Rev. 685 (2009). 
